Center for Employment Opportunities

San Diego

Retrospective Outcomes Analysis

May 2015

harder+company
community research

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Acknowledgements

Harder+Company would like to acknowledge and thank the project team for their contributions to and feedback on this report.

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We would also like to thank Mack Jenkins, Chief of Probation Officer for San Diego County, for his support on this project and for granting access to Probation and Sheriff's Department data for these analyses. We also owe many thanks to Karyn Milligan, Research Policy and Science Analyst for the San Diego County Probation Department, for her invaluable assistance in extracting and organizing data and for providing feedback on sections of this report.

Finally, the project team is grateful to the Nonprofit Finance Fund and the James Irvine Foundation for their generous support under the California Pay for Success Initiative.

San Diego Skyline photograph by Mark Shimazu 2013; Caltrans photograph by LaFonzo Carter 2012

Executive Summary

Overview

Criminal activity bears an expensive toll on society. Whether violent or nonviolent, crime endangers the public safety and incurs expenses on its victims and society. Taxpayers sustain significant costs for the incarceration and supervision of felony offenders. Public Safety Realignment (AB109) shifted the responsibility for incarceration and community supervision of a subset of felony offenders from the state of California to counties. As a result, more of these costs are now absorbed by counties.

The Center for Employment Opportunities (CEO) is a 30+ year old evidence-based intervention demonstrated to reduce subsequent days incarcerated and increase employment for formerly incarcerated individuals in New York. In 2011, CEO opened its doors in San Diego County (CEO-SD). The research summarized herein suggests that CEO-SD has demonstrated meaningful impact on returns to local custody. A broader study, involving partnership with state-level agencies and access to administrative datasets, could further substantiate CEO-SD's impact on individuals returning home from prison.

California Pay for Success Initiative

+ REDF, CEO, and Social Finance are part of a cohort of California Pay for Success projects funded by The James Irvine Foundation and Nonprofit Finance Fund to catalyze innovative approaches to pay for improved social services throughout the state.

+ Pay for Success drives new resources to deliver measurable outcomes on a larger scale for people most in need. After a social program area is selected and pre-defined outcomes have been mutually agreed upon, private investors provide up-front funding for evidence-based intervention providers. Government only pays for success.

+ Under the Initiative, Social Finance engaged Harder + Company to evaluate whether CEO-SD has a statistically significant impact on their clients' criminal justice outcomes.

+ San Diego County Probation and Sheriff's Departments participated in providing demographic and outcomes data on CEO-SD participants and a matched comparison group.



Executive Summary

Sample Characteristics

+ The study sample is composed of 300 Mandatory Supervision (MS) and Post Release Community Supervision (PRCS) offenders who began a term of probation in San Diego County between October 2011 and March 2014.

+ The treatment group (n=150) received services from CEO-SD. The Probation Comparison group (n=150) was not served by CEO-SD, but may have received other, non CEO-SD employment re-entry services.

+ Across both the CEO-SD participants and Comparison Group, members were:
  - Largely male (89%)
  - Predominately Black (57%), followed by Mexican/Hispanic (31%) and White (8%)
  - 31 years old, on average (range = 19-63 years)

+ Nearly all (95%) of the individuals in the study sample were most recently in custody for a felony charge.

+ Between 34-38% of individuals in the study sample were most recently incarcerated for a drug or alcohol offense, 29-30% for a crime against property, and 21-25% for a crime against person. Between 7-8% were most recently incarcerated for a weapons offense.

+ Based on the COMPAS Risk and Needs Assessment System, a validated offender risk assessment tool used by San Diego County Probation, approximately 81-85% of the sample had been evaluated as "high" risk to reoffend, 9% as "medium" risk and 6-7% as "low" risk

Booking Events and Offense Severity

CEO-SD clients were significantly less likely than the Comparison Group to experience any subsequent jail booking event (including flash incarcerations and probation revocations) as well as booking events that involve new criminal charges only.

Early Engagers

CEO-SD clients who enrolled in CEO within 90 days of their supervision start date (n=36) were similarly less likely to have any jail booking event (52.8%*) and less likely to have a booking event for a new criminal charge (27.8%†) than their matched counterparts. They also performed better than the CEO-SD group as a whole by about five percentage points in each case.

Percentage of Sample with Jail Booking Event after Probation Supervision Start Date



*Differences are statistically significant p<.05
†Difference approaches significance at p=.09

Executive Summary

Offense Severity

CEO-SD clients were also 16 percentage points less likely to be booked for a new felony charge than their counterparts. They were booked on new misdemeanor charges at approximately equal rates.

Severity of Jail Booking Charges		
	Felony Charge*	Misdemeanor Charge
CEO-SD	28.7%	4.7%
Probation Comparison Group	44.7%	5.3%

*Difference is statistically significant p<.01

Returns to Jail within One and Two Years

Returns to custody were compared within one- and two-year follow-up periods. CEO-SD clients were significantly less likely than their matched counterparts to return to jail on a new charge within one year of their release. Two-year follow up comparisons were not run exclusively on matched pairs due to size of the sample, but instead on all cases with at least a two-year follow up period. CEO participants were again less likely to return to jail on a new charge within two years of release. This difference was not statistically significant, but approached significance at p=.08.

Percentage of Sample Returning to Jail on New Charges within 1 and 2 Years of Supervision Start Date		
	1 Year* (n=294)	2 years† (n=170)
CEO-SD*	8.2%	20%
Probation Comparison Group*	19.8%	32.9%

*Difference is statistically significant p<.01
†Difference approaches significance at p=.08

Number of Days Incarcerated

The total number of days incarcerated after supervision start date was calculated for both samples and mean differences were analyzed. CEO-SD clients, on average, spent 10 fewer days in jail for new charges and 11 fewer days in jail overall. Differences were not statistically significant. However, given that the Comparison Group was more likely to be booked on a new felony charge; the lack of significance here may reflect larger numbers of the Comparison Group being sentenced to state prison (for which bed days are not captured here because state data were not part of our analysis) following their county jail booking.

Mean Number of Days in Jail		
	Mean Days in Jail (total)	Mean Days in Jail (new charges only)
CEO-SD	41.71 (se=5.14)	37.52 (se=6.84)
Probation Comparison Group	52.78 (se=7.38)	47.49 (se=7.36)

Executive Summary

Conclusion

This study examined whether realigned offenders who received services from CEO-SD differed from a comparison group on four key indicators: returns to local custody, new felony charges, number of days spent in San Diego County jail, and time from release to return to custody. CEO-SD clients outperformed their comparison group counterparts with statistical significance on all assessed outcomes, with the exception of the number of days incarcerated. CEO-SD clients especially outperformed the comparison group when considering booking events associated with new charges and those associated with new felony charges.

Potential Next Steps

The research summarized herein suggests that CEO-SD has demonstrated meaningful impact on returns to local custody. A broader study, involving partnership with state-level agencies and access to administrative datasets, would further substantiate the extent of CEO-SD's impact on an individual's overall recidivism and employment outcomes.

- **Examine returns to state custody.** Analysis of conviction and sentencing data would indicate how many realigned offenders who returned to custody on new charges were convicted, and whether those convictions resulted in a sentence to state prison. *Potential data source: San Diego County District Attorney's Office*
- **Examine employment outcomes.** Analysis of length of employment and base wage earnings for CEO clients versus their Probation Comparison Group counterparts would affirm the impact of CEO-SD on employment outcomes in San Diego County. *Potential data source: State of California's Employment Development Department (EDD)*

Introduction

Introduction

California has the second largest prison population in the country, with prisons having operated at around 200 percent of capacity over the past decade.[1] Ensuring the public safety while also managing the size of the incarcerated population is a priority for policymakers, administrators, and officials across California. Recent developments have put increasing pressure on local California governments to manage the size and outcomes of their incarcerated population.

In 2011, California Governor Jerry Brown signed Assembly Bill (AB) 109, in response to the extreme overcrowding of California prisons due to what he called a "revolving door" for recidivating inmates. AB 109, often referred to as California Public Safety Realignment, shifted responsibility for the incarceration and community supervision for specified groups of offenders from the state to California counties.

- **Post Release Community Supervision (PRCS)** offenders are those that were released from state prison after serving determinate sentences for a non-serious, non-violent, or a non-high risk sex crime. Prior to Realignment, these offenders would have been supervised by parole but are now supervised by county probation departments for up to 3 years.[1]
- **Mandatory Supervision (MS)** offenders are individuals who are convicted of a PC1170(h)(5) felony offense and sentenced to serve part of their time in county jail and the remainder of their sentence in the community under mandatory Probation supervision.

Under AB109, counties received $400 million in state funding to support the incarceration and supervision of these new local offender populations, as well as to support the implementation of programs that provide housing, clinical, case management, and workforce development services to reduce recidivism in California. Under this new paradigm, counties are increasingly looking at new solutions to manage the interrelated challenges of public safety and incarceration.

The Relationship between Employment and Recidivism

Finding and retaining employment are significant steps towards successful reintegration into the community for formerly incarcerated offenders. Evidence suggests that securing employment is central to reducing the chances that an individual will recidivate and that holding a steady job increases the financial, social, and psychological agency associated with the reduction of high-risk behaviors that could lead to re-incarceration. [9,10,11] Though the social and economic benefits of having a job may function as a protective factor against recidivism, the path to employment for people with criminal records is not an easy one. Employers may be reluctant and sometimes prohibited from hiring former offenders depending on the nature of the convictions and the type of work performed [12,13,14]. Some studies have found that people who have been previously incarcerated work up to 11 fewer weeks a year, on average [15], and that criminal history continues to significantly affect an individual's chances of employment for up to seven years. [13,16,17,18] The time from reentry to employment also matters, with one study showing that individuals who secure a job within the first three months of reentry are less likely

[1] PRCS can be released from probation's supervision as early as 6 months; those without any custodial violation must (by law) be released at 12 months.

to recidivate.[19] Considering the barriers faced by individuals returning home from prison, access to timely employment upon reentry may be one important factor in ensuring an individual's successful reintegration.

Center for Employment Opportunities

In the 1970s, the Center for Employment Opportunities (CEO) began as a demonstrated project of the Vera Institute of Justice in order to address employment barriers facing the formerly incarcerated following release. In 1996, CEO became an independent nonprofit organization. In the last decade, CEO has made more than 17,000 job placements for formerly incarcerated persons into full-time employment. The program model uses a four-phased approach to set individuals up for success by offering life skills education, short-term paid transitional employment, full-time job placement, and post-placement services. Over the past 20 years, CEO has expanded to 11 locations in four states. In 2014, CEO enrolled over 4000 individuals and made over 2000 job placements, nationally. [19]

CEO's vision is that anyone returning from prison who wants to work has the preparation and support needed to find a job and stay attached to the labor force. CEO targets the highest risk, hardest to serve individuals, recruiting directly from parole and probation officers, ideally within the first 90 days of release. The ideal client is someone who needs a job and is likely to fail in their reentry without a targeted intervention.

Evidence from a randomized control trial conducted between 2004 and 2007 by MDRC demonstrated that CEO's integrated service delivery model can lead to reduced recidivism, and for high risk people, increased employment. MDRC concluded that CEO significantly reduced recidivism with the largest impacts for the group of participants recently released from prison. Formerly incarcerated individuals served by CEO were significantly less likely than control group members to be arrested, convicted of a crime, or incarcerated, representing a reduction of 16 to 22 percent across these three outcomes [21]

CEO's San Diego, California office opened in late 2011 and primarily serves individuals returning home from prison or serving terms of community supervision as a result of AB109 (hereafter referred to as realigned offenders). Individuals are referred to CEO San Diego (CEO-SD) by the San Diego County Probation Department. In April 2013, MDRC assessed the San Diego office's fidelity to the research-tested CEO program model and found that CEO San Diego had replicated with a high degree of fidelity.

Evaluation of CEO San Diego by Harder+Company Community Research

REDF, CEO, and Social Finance are part of a cohort of California Pay for Success projects funded by The James Irvine Foundation and Nonprofit Finance Fund to catalyze innovative approaches to paying for improved social services throughout the state. Social Finance commissioned Harder+Company Community Research to conduct a retrospective outcomes analysis to determine CEO-SD's impact on key social outcomes.

As with any analysis, this report is limited to the specific data we were able to access. San Diego County Probation and Sheriff's Departments participated in providing the background and outcome data on CEO-SD participants and a matched comparison group.

The San Diego County Probation Department measures recidivism of realigned offenders by tracking new convictions (felony or misdemeanor) that occur during their period of supervision, regardless of the length of the term of probation supervision. Once an individual completes his or her term of supervision, San Diego County Probation Department no longer tracks whether he or she sustains a conviction.

The final research questions addressed in the current study are therefore limited to those that address **returns to local custody only**:

Do realigned offenders served by CEO-SD differ from realigned offenders who were not served by CEO-SD on the following indicators?

1. Returns to custody
2. New felony charges
3. Number of days spent in San Diego County jail
4. Time from release to return to custody

The next section of this report details the methods used to address these research questions.

Methods

Methods

Employing a Retrospective Design

This study seeks to assess whether realigned offenders who received the CEO-SD intervention were more successful at avoiding returns to local custody than similar realigned offenders who did not receive CEO-SD services. When attempting to assess the impact of an intervention, researchers typically focus on examining differences between outcomes for two equivalent groups of individuals, one of which received intervention and the other of which did not. Sometimes this can be structured prospectively, via random assignment of individuals to an intervention and control group, whereby it is assumed that the only difference between individuals in the two groups is whether or not they received the intervention; therefore, any differences in outcomes can be attributed to the intervention (often referred to as *causal inference*).

In this study, Harder+Company employed a retrospective design, using the statistical technique Propensity Score Matching (PSM) to construct the most similar comparison group to CEO-SD clients by identifying a 1 to 1 match between intervention clients and the larger pool of realigned offenders who did not receive CEO-SD services. PSM is a robust methodology for creating a comparison group retrospectively with minimal selection bias. PSM enables a researcher to approximate random assignment to treatment where random assignment is not feasible or ethical, strengthening the basis for causal inference; however, omission of unobserved covariates can still lead to bias in propensity score estimation. [22] Nonetheless, by careful consideration of the covariates used, researchers can minimize this potential for bias.

Defining the Sample

Probation provided demographic, criminal history and assessed risk characteristics on CEO-SD participants as well as MS and PRCS offenders who began a term of probation between October 2011 and March 2014, but were not served by CEO. Appendix A lists the full list of the variables provided by San Diego County Probation and by San Diego County Sheriff's Department.

- October 1, 2011 was selected as the earliest supervision start date for the comparison group to reflect when the first realigned offenders were referred to CEO-SD.
- In order to allow adequate follow up time to observe outcomes of interest while also capturing a sufficient sample size, March 31, 2014 was selected as last supervision start date.
- MS and PRCS Offenders were selected as the populations from which to draw the comparison group because they are generally the same populations from which San Diego County Probation generates referrals for CEO.

Conducting the Propensity Score Match

First, data were inspected for degree of missingness.

- **Total Pool for Comparison Group (4019 cases).** Cases that were missing COMPAS risk scores[2] were eliminated as potential matches. As none of the CEO-SD group was identified in the data as a sex offender, all sex offenders in the comparison group were also eliminated as potential matches. The resulting pool from which matches were drawn for comparison comprised of 4,019 cases.
- **Treatment Group (150 cases)**. Four CEO-SD cases were eliminated from the intervention group prior to matching due to missing IDs, demographic data, COMPAS risk data and offense data. CEO-SD provided enrollment dates for all participants and the time from CEO enrollment to probation supervision start date was calculated. Two more CEO-SD cases were subsequently eliminated, together with their matched comparisons, when it was discovered that an erroneous supervision start date had been provided for these clients. This resulted in an intervention sample of 150 cases.

Comparison cases were selected via a *greedy nearest neighbor matching technique without replacement*, matching each CEO-SD case to a formerly incarcerated individual most similar to them. Matches that were too dissimilar were excluded, as measured by standard deviations of the distance metric.[3] Finally, in order to ensure an exact match of males to males and females to females, propensity scores were run for each sex, and the resulting two datasets were then combined to produce an analysis file containing both males and females.

Observations from the Matching Process

To examine whether the matching was successful, we report results from t-tests on all variables prior to and post propensity score estimation to estimate the degree of dissimilarity between CEO-SD members and the comparison group.

Table 1 shows the variables used in the match as well as the mean differences pre- and post-match. Pre-match, significant differences were found between the CEO-SD group and the comparison group:

- **Race**. CEO-SD clients were more likely to be Black and less likely to be White;
- **Age**. CEO-SD clients were younger on average;
- **COMPAS level**. CEO-SD clients were more likely to be rated as high-risk for recidivism on the COMPAS and less likely to be rated as low-risk;

[2] Correctional Offender Management Profiling for Alternative Sanctions (COMPAS) is a research-based, risk and needs assessment tool for criminal justice practitioners to assist them in the placement, supervision, and case management of offenders in community and secure settings. For more information about the tool, see: http://www.northpointeinc.com/files/downloads/Reentry.pdf. For more information about the COMPAS data used in this study, see the variable definitions in Appendix A.

[3] We used a caliper of .25 of the standard deviation of the logit of the propensity score.

- **Crime against persons**. CEO-SD clients were more likely to have been recently released for a crime against person;
- **Facility level**. CEO-SD clients were more likely to have been released from a Level 2 facility, and less likely to have been released from a local facility or a local women's facility;

These pre-match differences align with expectations given the population that CEO-SD serves. For example, one might expect that CEO-SD participants were more likely to be scored as "high-risk" for recidivism given that factors related to employment are assessed on the COMPAS (and therefore, lack of an employment history or appropriate skills for employment could contribute to someone receiving a higher risk score). Similarly, younger realigned offenders may have less work experience and therefore greater employment needs, which could explain why CEO-SD's clients were about 7 years younger on average pre-match.

All variables exhibiting a significant mean difference prior to the match became non-significant after matching, indicating appropriate matches were found. All mean differences were reduced as a result of the match except alcohol or drug (AOD) offense; nonetheless the increase was small and the mean difference after matching did not reach statistical significance.

Table 1. Mean Differences between CEO-SD and Comparison Cases Pre- and Post-match

	Pre-Match			Post-Match		
	CEO-SD (n=152)	Comparison (n=4019)	Mean Difference	CEO-SD (n=152)	Comparison (n=152)	Mean Difference
Supervision Start	05-DEC-2012	22-NOV-2012	13	05-DEC-2012	30-NOV-2012	5
Race Black	.58	.26	.31***	.57	.57	.00
Race White	.08	.38	-.39***	.07	.07	.00
Race Hispanic	.30	.30	.001	.30	.30	.00
Race Other	.07	.07	.001	.07	.07	.00
Age at Supervision Start (days)	11465	14151	-2685***	11465	11511	-45
Gender	.11	.11	-.001	.11	.11	.00
COMPAS Level High	.80	.73	.07*	.80	.84	-.04
COMPAS Level Medium	.09	.12	-03	.09	.09	.00
COMPAS Level Low	.07	.15	-.07**	.07	.05	.01
Crime Against Person	.20	.12	.08**	.20	.25	-.04
Crime Against Property	.30	.35	-.05	.29	.29	00
AOD Offense	.38	.39	-.001	.38	.33	.04
Weapons Offense	.07	.05	.02	.07	.08	-.006
Risk of Violence	8.29	8.02	.62	8.29	8.68	-.39
Facility Level 2	.20	.12	.07**	.20	.23	-.03
Facility Level 3	.22	.25	-.03	.22	.21	.01
Facility Level 4	.30	.33	-.03	.30	.23	.07
Women's Facility	.07	.08	-.01	.07	.07	.00
Facility Local	.03	.07	-.04*	.03	.03	.00
Women's Facility, Local	.001	.03	-.02**	.0066	.0000	.00

*** $p < .001$; ** $p < .01$; * $<.05$

- "Other" Races include: Samoan, Filipino, Laotian, Guamanian
- The 45 release facilities were combined into 6 different types of facilities based on security level. Women's facilities were grouped separately from men's and county jails were grouped separately from state penitentiaries. This resulted in a total of 6 facility categories.

Results

Results

Demographics

As shown in Table 2, the overall sample was largely male (88.7%), African-American (57.3%), and averaged 31 years old. Nearly all (94.7%) of the members of both CEO-SD and comparison groups were under supervision after having been incarcerated for a felony offense.[4] Similarly, the majority (81% of CEO participants and 85% of comparison group members) scored as "high risk" on the COMPAS (Table 3). Group members were almost evenly split between having been incarcerated for a crime against a person, crime against property and drug and alcohol offenses (ranging from 20-38% across the three categories in each group).

Table 2. Demographic Characteristics

		CEO-SD	Comparison Group
Age and Gender	Mean Age	31.0 years	31.1 years
	Male	88.7%	88.7%
	Female	11.3%	11.3%
Race/Ethnicity	African American	57.3%	57.3%
	Mexican/ Hispanic	30.7%	31.3%
	White	8.0%	8.0%
	Asian/Pacific Islander	3.4%	2.7%
	American Indian	0.7%	0.7%

Table 3. Criminal History and Risk Score

		CEO-SD	Comparison Group
Offense Category	Felony	94.7%	94.7%
	Misdemeanor	4.0%	4.7%
	Drug/Alcohol Offense	38.0%	34.0%
	Crime against Property	30.0%	29.3%
	Crime against Person	20.7%	24.7%
	Weapons Offense	6.7%	8.0%
	Other	3.3%	3.3%
COMPAS Risk Level	High	81.3%	84.7%
	Low	7.3%	6.0%
	Medium	8.7%	9.3%
	Not Scored	2.7%	0.0%

[4] In the data provided by Probation, 5.3% of the sample had a committing offense that was either missing or identified as a misdemeanor. By definition PRCS and MS Offenders are felons, therefore it is possible that these 5.3% were erroneously coded and, in actuality, 100% of the sample was most recently incarcerated for a felony.

Returns to Custody and Offense Categories

For any realigned offender (PRCS and MS) in the sample who returned to jail during the follow up period, booking dates (both in and out) and associated charges were included in the data that were provided by San Diego County Sheriff's Department. From there, returns to custody were grouped into three categories: a return to custody on a new charge, a return to custody for a probation revocation, and a return to custody on a flash incarceration.[5]

New Charges

A return to custody on a new criminal charge is the most serious outcome assessed in the current study. In this case, a realigned offender has been arrested and charged with one or more new crimes for actions that would be considered criminal whether or not a person was on probation. For example, an individual would have a "new criminal charge" if she was previously incarcerated on a weapon's charge and while on probation she was arrested and charged with motor vehicle theft. If criminal conviction data were available to be examined in this study, it would most likely exist on a subset of these individuals whose new charges resulted in a conviction.

Probation Revocations

Typically, when an individual under probation's supervision has committed a technical violation of his/her terms of probation, he or she appears before a judge for a probation violation hearing. Ultimately, the judge will determine whether to reinstate, modify, or revoke the individual's current term of probation. If the individual's probation is revoked, he or she will be sentenced to serve out his sentence in either jail or prison. An individual who fails to report to his probation officer or fails to enter treatment, when that was a term of his probation, may have his probation revoked and be returned to jail. In this case, he has not committed nor will he be convicted of any new crime, but still will spend additional time in custody.

Flash Incarcerations

Flash incarceration, the imposition of a period in county jail for not more than 10 consecutive days, is similar to a probation revocation in that it results from a violation of a PRCS offender's term of probation. This is an allowable sanction under the Post Release Community Supervision Act of 2011 (CA Penal Code Section 3450) designed to punish, yet not derail a PRCS offender (by keeping him/her in the community, for example). San Diego County agencies that are responsible for post release supervision are permitted by law to use flash incarceration as intermediate sanction to affect behavior change in adherence with the evidence-based principle of a swift and certain response to negative behavior. Flash incarcerations do not require going before a judge and do not result in additional criminal charges to the individual's record. As in the case of probation revocations, flash incarceration is a distinct form of punishment that is not considered "recidivism" in either local or state definitions, yet still results in an individual spending additional time incarcerated at government's cost.

For the purposes of this study, flash incarcerations and probation revocations were conceptually grouped together and analyses were run with flash incarcerations and probation revocations included (together),

[5] Under current California statute, only PRCS offenders (not MS offenders) can be returned to custody on a flash incarceration.

along with new charges to capture any returns to custody, as well as with flash incarcerations and revocations excluded (together) such that new charges only remained as an outcome.

Results: Returns to Custody Including Flash Incarcerations and Revocations

The first set of analyses took all matched cases to compare differences between the CEO client group and the comparison group on returns to custody after probation supervision start date, as indicated by a county jail booking event in San Diego County Sheriff Department's data system. For these analyses, chi-square difference tests were computed and booking events for any reason (including flash incarceration and probation revocation) were included in the analyses. As shown in Table 4, CEO clients were less likely to have a jail booking after beginning a term of probation (58%), relative to the comparison group (70%).

Additional analyses were run to examine whether those CEO clients who engaged early on during their term of probation were more successful in avoiding a return to custody. The average time to CEO enrollment from supervision start date was 217.21 days (SD=174.39), with the shortest time to enrollment being 6 days and the longest 824 days. Thirty-six CEO clients were enrolled into the program 90 days or less from the supervision start date (a recommended target according to the program model). Each client was paired with the comparison propensity scored matched case for the following analyses. As shown in Table 4 below, 52.8% of clients who engaged in CEO within 90 days of their release experienced a booking event when flash incarcerations and revocations were included, relative to 77.8% of their comparison group counterparts. Those 36 early engagers were also about 5 percentage points less likely to have a booking event than the CEO participant group as a whole.

Table 4. Return to Custody: Includes Flash Incarcerations and Revocations

All	CEO-SD (n=150)	Comparison (n=150)	Chi-square	p	Phi (Effect Size)
Percentage with a booking event after supervision start date (all)	58.0%	70.0%	4.18	<.05	.13
Early Engagers	CEO-SD (n=36)	Comparison (n=36)	Chi-square	p	Phi (Effect Size)
Percentage with a booking event after supervision start date (early engagers)	52.8%	77.8%	3.92	<.05	.26

Results: Offense Severity

As mentioned earlier, offense charges were included alongside each jail booking date in the data provided by San Diego County Sheriff's Department. Chi-square tests were computed to assess differences between the CEO group and probation group on the category of offense associated with all returns to custody.[6]

[6] It should be noted that in all analyses examining offense category, the primary reason for the booking event is taken hierarchically and is then used as the unit of analysis. In other words, if an individual had felony and misdemeanor charges within the same booking event, only the felony would be represented in the following analyses. Similarly, any booking event associated with a flash incarceration would appear as a flash incarceration and any booking event associated with a revocation would appear as a revocation.

Less than one-third (28.7%) of CEO participants who returned to custody, returned on a new felony charge, compared to 44.7% of the comparison group (Table 5). There were no statistically significant differences in the percentages of misdemeanors, flash incarcerations or revocations between groups. Further, when looking at the percentages returning to custody for each offense category no differences were found between CEO early engaging clients and the control group.

Table 5. Offense Category

	CEO-SD (n=150)	Comparison (n=150)	Chi-square	p	Phi (Effect Size)
Felony (all)	28.7%	44.7%	7.59	<.01	.16
Felony (early engagers)	22.2%	38.9%	1.64	ns*	.18
Misdemeanor (all)	4.7%	5.3%	.00	ns	.01
Misdemeanor (early engagers)**	2	4	n/a	n/a	n/a
Flash Incarceration (all)	16.0%	12.0%	.69	ns	.06
Flash Incarceration (early engagers)	19.4%	16.7%	1.00	ns	.04
Probation Revocation (all)	8.7%	8.0%	.00	ns	.01
Probation Revocation (early engagers)**	3	3	n/a	n/a	n/a

*ns = non –significant difference; p value is not less than .05

**Cell sizes too small to conduct significance tests – raw numbers are reported.

Results: Returns to Custody Excluding Flash Incarcerations and Revocations

For the next set of analyses all flash incarcerations and revocations were recoded to zero so that they were not counted as a booking event, but rather as a 'no-booking' event. The percentage of CEO clients with a booking event decreased from 58% (see Table 4 above) when including flash incarcerations and revocations to 33.3% (see Table 6) when new charges only were included. However, when CEO early engagers (those who enrolled in CEO within 90 days of supervision start date) were compared to their counterparts on returns to custody for new charges only, the chi-square just failed to reach significance (p=.09).

Table 6. Returns to Custody: Excludes Flash Incarcerations and Probation Revocations

All	CEO-SD (n=150)	Comparison (n=150)	Chi-square	p	Phi (Effect Size)
% with a booking event after supervision start date	33.3%	50.0%	7.89	<.01	.17
Early Engagers	CEO-SD (n=36)	Comparison (n=36)	Chi-square	p	Phi (Effect Size)
% with a booking event after supervision start date	27.8%	50.0%	2.86	.09	.23

In both versions of analyses (where flash incarcerations and revocations are excluded and included), CEO clients are less likely to return to custody than their probation comparison group counterparts. The difference between the groups is the greatest when new charges only are examined, suggesting that CEO participants are less likely than their counterparts to return to custody on new charges, particularly felonies. As shown in Table 5, the groups do not differ significantly on the percentages that return to custody for misdemeanors (4.7% vs. 5.3%, p>.05), flash incarcerations (16.0% vs. 12.0%, p>.05) or probation revocations (8.7% vs 8.0%, p>.05). This indicates that the difference in the new felony charges is driving the overall differences in returns to custody between the groups.

Length of Time before Returning to Custody

As a follow-up analysis, the time to the booking event was explored using Kaplan Meier curves. This analysis measures the cumulative probability of 'survival' before an event occurs, while taking into account those cases for whom the event did not occur and those who were 'lost' to the study before the time period ended. These latter cases are known as censored cases.

Figure 1. Survival Functions with Flash Incarcerations Included



Table 7. Median Cumulative Survival Rate to a Booking Event: Includes Flash Incarcerations and Revocations

	Median				Breslow (Generalized Wilcoxon)	
	Estimate (days)	SE	C.I Lower Bound	C.I. Upper Bound	Chi-square	p
CEO-SD	805	50.83	705.37	904.63	5.55	<.05
Comparison	703	60.65	584.11	821.89		

Note: the median is provided rather than the mean, which for this analysis refers to the distribution under the curve rather than a central estimate of time to event.

For this first analysis, which included all returns to custody, 42% of the CEO-SD clients and 30% of the comparison cases were censored. As illustrated in Figure 1, the cumulative survival rate for CEO-SD clients was greater than for comparison cases and this difference was significant. Table 7 shows that there was a median difference of 102 days between CEO-SD and comparison groups, with CEO-SD clients surviving longer without having a booking.

Figure 2. Survival Functions with Flash Incarcerations Excluded



Table 8. Median Cumulative Survival Rate to a Booking Event: Excludes Flash Incarcerations and Revocations

	Median				Breslow (Generalized Wilcoxon)	
	Estimate (days)	SE	C.I Lower Bound	C.I. Upper Bound	Chi-square	p
CEO-SD	1066	30.51	1006.19	1125.81	9.90	<.01
Comparison	883	83.81	718.74	1047.26		

Note: the median is provided rather than the mean, which for this analysis would refer to the distribution under the curve rather than a central estimate of time to event.

Next, flash incarcerations and revocations were removed from the analyses and another Kaplan Meier Analysis performed. For this second analysis, 66.7% of the CEO-SD clients and 50% of the comparison cases were censored. Once again, a significantly longer cumulative survival rate is observed for CEO-SD clients with a median difference of 183 days between groups (Table 8).

Figure 2 provides a visual representation of the difference in survival curves for CEO-SD clients when compared with the comparison group, when returns to custody on flash incarceration and revocations are excluded from analyses.

Days in Jail

Finally, independent samples t-tests were used to assess differences in the number of days spent in jail between groups.[7] [23] For this average, zeros were included for those cases in which there was no jail time.

Tables 9 and 10 show that there were no significant differences between CEO-SD clients and the comparison group in the average number of days in jail (often referred to as "bed days" when assessing the costs associated with keeping a prisoner incarcerated for lengths of time). This was the case when days in jail for flash incarcerations and probation revocations were included in the analysis (Table 9) and when they were excluded (Table 10). Similarly, CEO-SD clients who engaged in CEO within 90 days of their supervision start date did not differ significantly from their comparison group counterparts on average number of bed days served. Nonetheless, the effect sizes across all four analyses (ranging from .11 to .32) indicate a small to moderate effect between groups. Given the previous results that indicate that comparison group members are significantly more likely to return to custody on new felony charges, it is possible that the lack of significance here is a reflection of more comparison group members being sentenced to state or federal prison rather than serving time in county jails. In those cases, their bed days would not be accounted for here.

[7] Schafer & Kang indicate that independent samples methods are appropriate when conducting significance tests with propensity score matched samples

Table 9. Mean Number of Days Spent in Jail: Includes Flash Incarcerations and Revocations

	CEO-SD mean (n=150)	Comparison mean (n=150)	t	p	SE Difference	Effects size (Cohen's d)
Days in jail (all)	41.71 (se=5.14)	52.78 (se=7.38)	-1.11	ns*	10.00	-.13
Days in jail (early engagers)	25.33 (se=7.78)	48.64 (se=14.72)	-1.4	ns	16.64	-.32

Table 10. Mean Number of Days Spent in Jail: Excludes Flash Incarcerations and Revocations

	CEO-SD mean (n=150)	Comparison mean (n=150)	t	p	SE Difference	Effects size (Cohen's d)
Days in jail flash	37.52 (se=6.84)	47.49 (se=7.36)	-.99	ns*	10.04	-.11
Days in jail (early engagers)	21.78 (se=7.86)	44.31 (se=14.98)	-1.33	ns	16.92	-.31

*ns = non –significant difference; p value is not less than .05

Returns to Custody within One and Two Years

The next sets of analyses were conducted to assess differences between CEO-SD and comparison groups within a 1-year follow-up period and again within a 2-year follow-up period.

Bookings within 1 year: Includes Flash Incarceration and Probation Revocations

For the 1-year follow-up, three cases were excluded together with their three matched comparisons because they had less than a 365-day follow-up period. Table 11 supports the results shown in the survival graph. Approximately 86% of CEO-SD clients, compared to 78% of comparison cases, had no booking event within the year, with a trend towards significance in the difference between groups and a small effect size. CEO-SD clients experienced fewer felony bookings than comparison cases, by 9.5 percentage points. This difference between groups is statistically significant, with a small to moderate effect size. The number of misdemeanors, flash incarcerations and revocations between groups were too small to assess statistically, therefore only raw numbers are presented.

Bookings within 2 years: Includes Flash Incarceration and Probation Revocations

In estimating a follow-up period of 2-years, only 48 CEO-SD clients had a matched comparison with a 2-year follow-up period (for a full sample size of 96). When analyses were run it was found that cell sizes were too small for significance testing therefore the 2-year follow-up is predicated on all cases that have a 2-year follow-up period, regardless of match. While 48 of these pairs are a direct match, the others are not so this analysis is a simple comparison.

Table 11. Returns to Custody within One-Year Follow-up Periods: Includes Flash Incarceration and Revocations

		CEO-SD (n=147)	Comparison (n=147)	Chi-square	p	Phi (Effect Size)
Return to Custody within First Year	Percentage with a booking event	14.3%	22.4%	7.26	=.10	.11
	Percentage with no booking event	85.7%	77.6%			
	Felony	7.5%	17.0%	5.35	<.05	.14
	Misdemeanor: cell sizes too small for statistical assessment, raw numbers only	1	4	n/a	n/a	n/a
	Flash Incarceration: cell sizes too small for statistical assessment, raw numbers only	7	3	n/a	n/a	n/a
	Probation Revocation: cell sizes too small for statistical assessment, raw numbers only	2	1	n/a	n/a	n/a

Table 12. Returns to Custody within Two- Year Follow-up Periods: Includes Flash Incarceration and Revocations

		CEO-SD (n=85)	Comparison* (n=85)	Chi-square	p	Phi (Effect Size)
Return to Custody within First Two Years	Percentage with a booking event	37.6%	41.2%	.10	ns**	.04
	Percentage with no booking event	62.4%	58.8%			
	Felony	15.3%	30.6%	4.79	<.05	.18
	Misdemeanor: cell sizes too small for statistical assessment, raw numbers only	4	2	n/a	n/a	n/a
	Flash Incarceration	14.1%	8.2%	.95	ns	.09
	Probation Revocation: cell sizes too small for statistical assessment, raw numbers only	3	0	n/a	n/a	n/a

*Comparison group of all cases that have a 2-year follow-up period, regardless of match. While 48 of these pairs are a direct match, the others are not so this analysis is a simple comparison.
**ns = non –significant difference; p value is not less than .05

Despite the fact that the results estimated are not predicated on a directly matched sample, the patterns follow very closely to that shown in Figure 2 showing the survival curves for the matched sample. As displayed in Table 12, approximately 62% of CEO-SD clients, compared to 59% of comparison cases, had no booking event within two years. Further, only 15% of CEO-SD clients had a felony within 2 years, whereas nearly 31% of the comparison group had the same. This difference was also statistically significant with a small to moderate effect size.

Bookings within 1 year: Excludes Flash Incarceration and Probation Revocations

For the 1-year follow-up, three CEO-SD cases were excluded together with their three matched comparison cases because they had less than a 365-day follow-up period. Table 13 supports the results shown in the survival graph, approximately 92% of CEO-SD clients compared with 80% of comparison cases were *not* returned to custody on a new charge within the first year of release. This difference between groups is statistically significant with small to moderate effect size.

Bookings within 2 years: Excludes Flash Incarceration and Probation Revocations

As described above, in estimating a follow-up time period of 2-years, only 48 CEO-SD clients had a matched comparison with a 2-year follow-up time period (for a full sample size of 96). When analyses were run it was found that cell sizes were too small for significance testing therefore the 2-year follow-up is predicated on all cases that have a 2-year follow-up period. While 48 of the pairs are a direct match the others are not so this analysis is a simple comparison.

Despite the fact that the results estimated are not predicated on a directly matched sample, the patterns follow very closely to that shown in Figure 3 showing the survival curves for the matched sample. Within the first two years of release, 80% of the CEO clients and approximately 67% of the comparison group cases were *not* returned to custody on new charges. This difference approaches statistical significance at 0.08, with a small to moderate effect size.

Table 13: Returns to Custody within One- and Two-Year Follow-up Periods: Excludes Flash Incarceration and Revocations

		CEO-SD (n=147)	Comparison (n=147)	Chi-square	p	Phi (Effect Size)
1st Year	Percentage with a booking event	8.2%	19.8%	7.25	<.01	.17
	Percentage with no booking event	91.8%	80.3%			
		CEO-SD (n=85)	Comparison* (n=85)	Chi-square	p	Phi (Effect Size)
2Years	Percentage with a booking event	20.0%	32.9%	4.13	=.08	.15
	Percentage with no booking event	80.0%	67.1%			

*Comparison group of all cases that have a 2-year follow-up period, regardless of match. While 48 of these pairs are a direct match, the others are not so this analysis is a simple comparison.

Conclusions

Conclusions

Summary of Findings

This study examined whether realigned offenders served by CEO-SD differ from those who were not served by CEO-SD on four key indicators: returns to custody, new felony charges, number of days spent in San Diego County jail, and time from release to return to custody. CEO-SD clients outperformed their comparison group counterparts with statistical significance on all assessed outcomes, with the exception of the number of days incarcerated.

- **Returns to Custody:** When examining all returns to custody, including those for flash incarcerations and probation revocations, CEO-SD clients were 12% less likely than their comparison group counterparts to have a county jail booking event (58% and 70%, respectively). Further, while half (50%) of the comparison group returned to custody on a new criminal charge, only 33.3% of the CEO-SD client group did the same. These results suggest that CEO-SD clients are more successful in avoiding returns to custody, which may be the result of the services they receive from CEO or the employment gained because of CEO services.
- **New Felony Charges:** CEO-SD clients were 16 percentage points less likely than comparison group members to return to custody on a new felony charge (28.7% and 44.7% respectively). They were equally as likely to return to custody on a new misdemeanor charge, flash incarceration or probation revocation. This indicates that the difference in the new felony charges is driving the overall differences in returns to custody between the groups.
- **Days Spent in County Jail:** While CEO-SD clients spent an average of 11 fewer days in jail overall and 10 fewer days in jail on new charges, these differences were not statistically significant. Taken in context with all of the other significant results in this study, particularly the larger percentage of comparison group cases with new felony charges, the lack of significance on days in jail may be due to higher likelihood of comparison group members being sentenced to state prison, following their time in county jail.
- **Time from Release to Return to Custody:** Only 8% of CEO-SD clients returned to custody on a new charge within a year of their release, relative to nearly 20% of the comparison group members who did the same. Of those realigned offenders in the sample who had been under probation's supervision for 2 years or longer, 20% of CEO-SD clients returned to custody on a new charge within the first 2 years, relative to 32% of the comparison group.
- **Early Engagers:** Outcomes for early engagers in the CEO-SD program (i.e. those who enrolled in CEO within 90 days of their probation supervision start date) were examined as a subset of the CEO-SD client group. Early engagers were 25 percentage points less likely than their matched comparison group counterparts to return to custody for any reason. However, when new criminal charges only were examined, statistically significant differences were not repeated. Further, there were no significant differences between early engagers and their comparison group counterparts on returns to custody for any of the specific offense categories. In these cases, small sample size may have contributed to the lack of significance, as only 36 CEO-SD clients were early engagers.

Limitations and Future Directions

While the results described in this report offer preliminary evidence that suggests CEO-SD clients are less likely to recidivate than other similar realigned offenders in San Diego County, these analyses are the merely the first step in determining the overall impact of CEO San Diego. Outlined below are some considerations for interpreting the current results and possible next steps.

- **The current analyses are limited to an examination of returns to local custody (county jail) only.** Access to conviction and sentencing data were not granted in time for this study. Such data could be provided by the San Diego County District Attorney's Office to determine how many of those realigned offenders who returned to custody on new charges were convicted, and whether those convictions resulted in a sentence to state prison.
- **Employment outcomes were not examined in this study due to timing constraints around data pull**, however could be included in a future examination, particularly if the County was engaged to make the data request of the State of California's Employment Development Department (EDD). For example, analysis of length of employment and base wage earnings for CEO clients and Probation Comparison Group members would more fully assess the impact of CEO San Diego.
- **Finally, while this study finds that CEO-SD clients outperformed their counterparts on key recidivism outcomes, the methodology employed in this study does not enable us to conclude with certainty that CEO's intervention was the *reason* its clients outperformed.** Propensity Score Matching was used to minimize the bias due to confounding variables, yet there still may be external factors that affect the observed outcomes. Longitudinal analysis leveraging the data sources identified above may further substantiate these findings.

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Appendix A

Variable Definitions

Variable Name	Variable Label	Definition/Notes
ID001	Unique Participant ID	
ETHNICITY	Participant Ethnicity	As documented by Probation officer
GENDER	Participant Gender	
ZIP	Zip code of residence	Last reported zip code of residence to Probation Dept.
COMPAS_LVL	COMPAS Level	Overall assessed risk level based on COMPAS Risk Assessment. There are two recidivism scales risk of violent recidivism and risk of general recidivism. These scales are used in combination to determine a risk level (COMPAS_LVL). The highest of the two values is used to determine H, M, L High: 8-10 Medium 6-7 Low:1-5
R-VIOLENCE	Risk of violent recidivism	Ranges from 1(low)-10(high) High: 8-10 Medium 6-7 Low:1-5
R-RECIDIVISM	Risk for general recidivism	Ranges from 1(low)-10(high) High: 8-10 Medium 6-7 Low:1-5
COGBEHAVIOR	Cognitive Behavioral	Negative thoughts, values and beliefs continuing to support criminal or anti-social behavior. Cut points for all needs measures are: 1-5 low, 6 and 7 medium, and 8-10 high probability that the issue is impacting involvement in the criminal justice system.
CASSPEER	Criminal Associates/Peers	Negative influences introduced by friends. Cut points for all needs measures are: 1-5 low, 6 and 7 medium, and 8-10 high probability that the issue is impacting involvement in the criminal justice system.
CRIMOPP	Criminal Opportunity	Crime is easy to get into considering their daily routine. Cut points for all needs measures are: 1-5 low, 6 and 7 medium, and 8-10 high probability that the issue is impacting involvement in the criminal justice system.

CRIMPERS	Criminal Personality	Prevalence of traits related to anti-social personality. Cut points for all needs measures are: 1-5 low, 6 and 7 medium, and 8-10 high probability that the issue is impacting involvement in the criminal justice system.
CRIMATTSR	Criminal Thinking	Level of justification/rationalization/excuse making. Cut points for all needs measures are: 1-5 low, 6 and 7 medium, and 8-10 high probability that the issue is impacting involvement in the criminal justice system.
FAMCRIM	Family Criminality	Family members may be modeling criminal behavior. Cut points for all needs measures are: 1-5 low, 6 and 7 medium, and 8-10 high probability that the issue is impacting involvement in the criminal justice system.
FINANC	Financial	Social marginalization may lead to anti-social choices. Cut points for all needs measures are: 1-5 low, 6 and 7 medium, and 8-10 high probability that the issue is impacting involvement in the criminal justice system.
LEISURE	Leisure/Recreation	Too much unstructured time may lead anti-social activities to combat boredom. Cut points for all needs measures are: 1-5 low, 6 and 7 medium, and 8-10 high probability that the issue is impacting involvement in the criminal justice system.
RESINST	Residential Instability	Consistency and stability of a person's living situation Cut points for all needs measures are: 1-5 low, 6 and 7 medium, and 8-10 high probability that the issue is impacting involvement in the criminal justice system.
SOCADJ	Social Adjustment	How well a person adjusts in their social environment (school/work/family/marriage/relationships/finances). Cut points for all needs measures are: 1-5 low, 6 and 7 medium, and 8-10 high probability that the issue is impacting involvement in the criminal justice system.
SOCENV	Social Environment	Amount of crime/victimization potential/general disorder in individual's neighborhood. Cut points for all needs measures are: 1-5 low, 6 and 7 medium, and 8-10 high probability that the issue is impacting involvement in the criminal justice system.
SUPPORT	Social Isolation	Level of pro-social support networks and the level of offender's integration. Cut points for all needs

		measures are: 1-5 low, 6 and 7 medium, and 8-10 high probability that the issue is impacting involvement in the criminal justice system.
EJUVSOC	Socialization Failure	As a child/juvenile with specific attention to parental modeling. Cut points for all needs measures are: 1-5 low, 6 and 7 medium, and 8-10 high probability that the issue is impacting involvement in the criminal justice system.
SUBABUSE	Substance abuse	Identifies problem, not level of treatment needed. *Any score over 3 (4-10) indicates a high probability that the issue is impacting involvement in the criminal justice system.*
VOCED	Vocational/Education	Level of educational background/work skills person possesses to support self. Cut points for all needs measures are: 1-5 low, 6 and 7 medium, and 8-10 high probability that the issue is impacting involvement in the criminal justice system.
GRANTTYPE	Grant type	Type of Probationer: **Formal Probation (Formal):** Offenders charged under PC1203. These individuals are serving a period of probation in lieu of the execution of a sentence. **Mandatory Supervision Offender (MSO):** Offenders charged under PC1170 (h) (5) (b) for a non-serious, non-violent and non-sexual offense. These individuals serve a local prison term in the county followed by a mandatory term of supervision by the Probation department. The term of mandatory supervision is determined by the Court. **Post Release Community Supervision (PRCS) also known as 'PRO':** Offenders released to counties for supervision after completing their state prison sentence. These individuals would have previously been under parole supervision but are now supervised by Probation after release from prison. PRCS can last for up to 3 years, but can end earlier if the offender does not violate terms of supervision resulting in a return to custody.
RELEASE_FACILITY	Release Facility	Jail/Prison from which probationer was released
SUPSTART	Supervision Start Date	Date most recent term of probation began
SUP_EXPECTED_END_DATE	Supervision Expected End Date	Expected end date of probation supervision (corresponds to term of probation identified in SUPSTART field
SUPENDDATE	Supervision Actual End Date	Actual date probation supervision ended (blanks in this field indicate ongoing supervision).

CURRENTSTATUS	Current Status	Current probation status (as of date data were pulled from PCMS): **Closed**: is a manually (data entered) status that typically indicates a supervision that has not gone to full term expiration (Examples: early court termination for successful probation performance or, alternately, early termination due to revocation and sentencing to state prison.) The status does not itself adequate indicate success or failure, just termination of the supervision prior to full term. **Closed- expired:** is generated automatically by the case management system when an ongoing grant reaches the "expected end date" (SUP_EXPECTED_END_DATE above). **Revoked:** probation was revoked due to violation or new charge(s)
CASE_MS_OFFENSE	Case Most Serious Offense	Most serious charge that led to current supervision (criminal code)
CASE_OFFENSELEVEL	Case Offense Level	Offense level of charge that led to current supervision: **Misdemeanor** **Felony**
CASE_MS_CRIMECATEGORY	Case Most Serious Crime Category	Offense category of charge that led to current supervision: **Crime against person** **Crime against property** **Drug/alcohol offense** **Weapons offense** **Other**
GRANTENDREASON	Grant End Reason	Corresponds to reason an individual no longer holds their status as the type of offender identified under GRANTTYPE
CURRENT_SUPERVISION_LVL	Current Supervision Level	Assignment to a *supervision* level generally corresponds to the individual's assessed risk level on COMPAS but there are exceptions. Probation historically assigned offenders to high risk supervision if s/he scored 8 or higher on ***either*** the recidivism or violence risk scales. Recently, this classification was altered resulting in the exclusion of a group of individuals from being classified as high-risk that were previously. Probation now uses the supervision risk grouping below (High=8, 9 or 10 on the risk of violence ***AND*** the risk of recidivism). This procedure started for new cases effective 04/04/2014.

		High, Medium, and Low supervision levels are the core levels for regular probation, PRCS, and MSO supervisions. **Prop36:** An entirely separate supervision track for PC1210 drug treatment cases (successful program completion will result in dismissal of the criminal case. Failure can result in revocation and conversion to a traditional PC1203 probation or a prison commitment. There are no supervision levels associated with Prop 36 cases. **Reentry:** Reentry Court cases as essentially treated as High Risk supervision cases. **Other** Blanks indicate cases that are not currently under supervision do not have a supervision level.
CURRENT_SUPERVISION_TYPE	Current Supervision Type	Supervision type indicates a case that is being supervised on a specialty caseload (as distinguished from a regular supervision caseload). These designations are not generally helpful except, for example, seeing that someone is being supervised on a sex offender or administrative (lowest level banked) caseload.

Outcomes

Variable Name	Variable Label	Definition/Notes
BOOKNUM	Jail Booking Number	Booking number associated with county jail booking event
BOOK_DT	Booking Date	Date Booked into SD County Jail
BOOK_RLS_DT	Booking Release Date	Date Booked out of SD County Jail
OFFENSE_CODE	Offense Code	Offense Code associated with jail booking event **PC** = Penal Code **VC** = Vehicle Code **HS** = Health and Safety Code **PR** = Public Resources Code **US** = United States Code **BP** = Business and Professions Code
OFFENSE_SECTION	Offense Section	Specific Offense Code Section(s) associated with jail booking event
OFFENSE_DESCRIPTION	Offense Description	Description of offense(s) associated with jail booking event
OFFENSE_SEVERITY	Offense Severity	Severity of offense(s) associated with jail booking event **M**= misdemeanor **F**= felony